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Abstract: The article discusses the adoption 
of the new Optional Protocol to the Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights as a means to obtain redress for 
violations against economic, social and cultural 
rights in the international sphere – including 
its potential use for the consideration of the 
violation of extraterritorial obligations.
Keywords: Human rights. Social rights. Viola-
tions. Optinal protocol.
Resumo: O artigo discute a adoção do novo 
Protocolo Facultativo ao Pacto Internacional 
sobre os Direitos Econômicos, Sociais e Cul-
turais como um meio de obter reparação por 
violações a direitos econômicos, sociais e cul-
turais no âmbito internacional – inclusive a sua 
potencial utilização em casos de violação de 
obrigações extraterritoriais.
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International justiciability
The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims the interdepen-
dence, indivisibility and equal value of all human rights. However, the adoption, in 
1966, of two different universal instruments, a Covenant on Civil and Political ano-
ther Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, paved the way for a diffe-
rential treatment of both sets of human rights. A particularly telling example of this 
differential treatment was the original provision of a complaints procedure for viola-
tions of civil and political rights, while no such procedure was established regarding 
economic, social and cultural rights.
On 10 December 2008, the adoption of a new international instrument, the 
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (OP-ICESCR)2 has closed that legal protection gap, finally recognizing the 
justiciability of economic, social and cultural rights in the international sphere, on 
an equal footing with civil and political rights. It took the international community 
a long time to reach this stage. Early initiatives in the 1990s gathered little support, 
and only after intensive discussion in the context of a UN (United Nations) Open-
-ended Working Group, from 2003 to 2008, member States of the United Nations 
agreed to adopt the OP-ICESCR by consensus.3 Leading States,4 NGOs, treaty bo-
dies, academic institutions and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights were eventually successful in convincing the international community about 
the importance of providing access to international remedies in cases of alleged vio-
lations of economic, social and cultural rights.
1 The main issues under discussion in the drafting of the OP-ICESCR
The lack of an international complaints mechanism on economic, social and 
cultural rights has long given the impression that economic, social and cultural ri-
ghts were different in nature from civil and political rights. Some still maintain that 
economic, social and cultural rights are not suitable for adjudication. They consider 
economic, social and cultural rights to be too vague to be justiciable and think that 
they should be seen as aspirations or policy goals, rather than as legal entitlements. 
They also argue that decisions regarding policy choices cannot be discussed in a ju-
dicial or quasi-judicial setting, but should rest with (democratic) political authorities. 
Others question the potential consequences of adjudication in the field of economic, 
social and cultural rights on the basis of the resource implications that judicial deci-
sions may have.
2  Available at: <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cescr/docs/A-RES-63-117.pdf>.
3  For a view of the history of the Working Group, <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/escr/intro.htm>.
4  States which expressed strong views in favour of an OP-ICESCR included, within Europe, Portugal, Belgium, 
Finland and Spain, and generally the Latin American and African countries.
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In the course of the inter-governmental negotiations of the OP-ICESCR, the 
majority of States did not hold these views. In fact, they acknowledged the existen-
ce of a considerable comparative experience of judicial and quasi-judicial decisions 
in the area of economic, social and cultural rights, countering blanket assumptions 
against their justiciability.
The adoption of the OP-ICESCR may help to overcome such negative 
perceptions. It provides victims with international accountability mechanisms for 
addressing violations of this set of human rights, and allows the UN Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), its monitoring body, an opportunity 
to refine the understanding of their content, through interpreting their scope in the 
context of specific cases.
The existence of an international complaints mechanism might also create 
an incentive to strengthen the protection of economic, social and cultural rights at 
the national level. Apart from requiring States parties to provide remedies in speci-
fic cases, case law at the international level can also provide guidance and promote 
jurisprudence at the national level. Furthermore, as the exhaustion of domestic re-
medies is a condition for the admissibility of complaints by CESCR, States might be 
urged to provide domestic remedies where these are non-existent or inadequate.
2 The content of the OP-ICESCR
The OP-ICESCR provides for three different mechanisms:
a) A procedure for communications (complaints), allowing individuals and 
groups of individuals to present complaints before the CESCR in case 
of alleged violation of one or more of the economic, social and cultural 
rights recognized in the ICESCR – such as labour rights, the right to 
social security, the right to health, the right to food, the right to housing, 
the right to education, the right to water or cultural rights.
b) An inter-State complaint mechanism, allowing a State party to submit 
communications to CESCR alleging that another State party is not ful-
filling its obligations under the Covenant.
c) An inquiry procedure allowing CESCR to conduct an inquiry based on 
reliable information indicating grave or systematic violations of the 
ICESCR by a State Party.
The previous work of CESCR offers guidance about what can count as a 
violation of economic, social and cultural rights; several General Comments adopted 
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by the Committee provide specific examples.5 For instance, violations of economic, 
social and cultural rights can occur when States interfere unduly with their enjoy-
ment; when they fail to adopt steps towards their full realization; when they provide 
for or deny rights in a discriminatory manner; when they fail to comply with mi-
nimum core obligations (such as provision of essential medicines or ensuring uni-
versal, mandatory and free primary education); or adopt deliberately retrogressive 
measures without adequate justification. Violations also include failure to adopt me-
asures to protect individuals against the impact of economic crises or globalization 
on their economic, social and cultural rights.
The procedure established by the OP-ICESCR is similar to other quasi-judi-
cial communications mechanisms under the international human rights system. The 
practice of other treaty bodies regarding remedies is characterized by self-restraint: 
‘views’ (jurisprudential decisions) usually recommend States to provide adequate 
remedies, but rarely prescribe such remedies in detail, leaving some leeway for the 
States concerned to come with a solution. Even if the ability to impose remedies is 
weak, the power of the treaty body to declare that a violation has occurred in a spe-
cific case is perhaps the most important feature of the communications mechanism. 
Committees usually follow up on the measures taken by States as a result of views 
through their subsequent dialogue with them.
The OP-ICESCR generally sticks to the model of the most recent UN instru-
ments providing for communications mechanisms – such as the Optional Protocols 
to the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) 
and to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. But it also contains 
some new features. Most of these new features respond to two issues debated during 
the sessions of the Working Group: (1) whether the alleged ‘different’ nature of eco-
nomic, social and cultural rights required procedural adjustments, and (2) whether 
the text should reflect the obligations of ‘international cooperation and assistance’ 
included in the several provisions of the ICESCR.
2.1 Communications by individuals and groups of individuals
(1) Communications can be submitted by or on behalf of individuals or 
groups of individuals, under the jurisdiction of a State Party, claiming 
to be victims of a violation against a State that has ratified the Optional 
Protocol. When communications are submitted on behalf of individuals 
and groups of individuals, their consent is required, unless the petitio-
ner can justify acting on their behalf without such consent. In order for 
communications to be admissible, domestic remedies should be exhaus-
ted first, and the same fact should not be subject to similar international 
5  For the latest list of the General Comments by CESCR, see <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cescr/com-
ments.htm>.
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procedures. The Committee can also declare a case inadmissible if it 
does not find that the alleged victims suffered a clear disadvantage, un-
less it considers that it raises an issue of general importance.
While the procedure is similar to other communications mechanisms provi-
ded by international human rights instruments, including the possibility of reques-
ting interim measures, the OP-ICESCR incorporates some new features, such as the 
possibility for the Committee to accept a friendly settlement, and to consult a broader 
span of documentation emanating from other United Nations and regional agencies 
and bodies when considering communications. Some States also demanded that the 
OP-ICESCR clarified the standard of review to be employed by the Committee when 
considering communications. Consensus was reached to incorporate the standard 
of reasonableness to assess the steps taken by the State Party to realize the rights 
included in the Covenant, taking into account that the State Party may adopt a range 
of possible policy measures for complying with its duties.
2.2 Inter-State communications 
The inter-State communications procedure allows States parties to the Pro-
tocol to submit complaints when they consider that another State Party is not ful-
filling its obligations under the Covenant. Inter-State communications have been 
seldom employed under other Optional Protocols and equivalent instruments, as 
States prefer political fora to argue about alleged human rights violations committed 
by each other. In any case, the OP-ICESCR requires that States make an express 
declaration allowing for the use of inter-State communications – which might dis-
courage the effectiveness of this potentially valuable procedure.6
2.3 The inquiry procedure
This procedure allows the Committee to initiate an inquiry when it receives 
reliable information indicating grave or systematic violations by a State Party of any 
of the economic, social and cultural rights set forth in the Covenant.7 Similar pro-
cedures have shown to be effective under the Convention against Torture and the 
Optional Protocol to CEDAW. However, while in those instruments the State needs 
to make a declaration not to be bound by the inquiry procedure, the OP-ICESCR 
requires the State to make an express declaration to be bound by the procedure.
6  See comments on its potential use for extraterritorial obligations below.
7  Ibid.
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2.4 International assistance and cooperation
The OP-ICESCR has also incorporated provisions which acknowledge the 
legal dimensions of international assistance and cooperation:
a) Recommendations to UN entities: the Committee, with the consent of the 
State party concerned, may transmit its views and recommendations 
concerning communications and inquiries to United Nations agencies 
and other competent bodies, or to bring to their attention relevant mat-
ters arising out of communications, when it is apparent that there is a 
need for technical advice or assistance, or that international measures 
may contribute to assisting State parties in implementing the rights re-
cognized in the Covenant.
b) Establishment of a trust fund: the OP provides for the establishment of a 
trust fund, with a view to providing expert and technical assistance for 
the enhanced implementation of the rights in the Covenant. The fund 
would be financed through voluntary contributions and needs to attract 
sufficient, regular funding to become operational. In the negotiation 
process, African countries pushed for the inclusion of such provision, 
while donor countries were generally skeptical about the justification of 
such fund.
3 Extraterritorial obligations and the OP-ICESCR
Even if the ICESCR does not make any reference to territorial or jurisdic-
tional limits to its application, and in fact makes express reference to international 
assistance and cooperation as a legal obligation, the submission of communications 
under the OP-ICESCR is restricted to individuals or groups of individuals under the 
jurisdiction of the State party against which a violation of the ICESCR is alleged. ‘Ju-
risdiction’ is not necessarily confined to the territory of the State Party: CESCR has 
already indicated that a State party has jurisdiction beyond its own territory. The 
Committee has maintained that Covenant obligations apply to any territory over 
which a State party has geographical, functional or personal jurisdiction, including 
dependent territories8 and territories where a State has de facto control.9
However, the extent of the extraterritorial jurisdiction of States regarding 
economic, social and cultural rights is still being discussed under international law. 
Whether the human rights treaty extends to situations outside of the State’s own ter-
ritory and thus also affords those people its protection is a topical issue and arguably 
8  CESCR, Concluding Observations the Netherlands E/1999/22 para. 194.
9  CESCR, Concluding Observations Israel E/1999/22 para. 232.
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there is no generally accepted presumption in favour of State jurisdiction beyond its 
own territory or the territories under its control (SALOMON; SEIDERMAN, 2012). 
Consequently, under the OP-ICESCR petitioners will bear the burden of proof in es-
tablishing that a violation occurring outside a State’s territory falls within the State’s 
jurisdiction.
The inter-State communication and the inquiry procedures might be more 
fitting for the consideration of extraterritorial violations of economic, social and cul-
tural rights, as neither of them restricts the violations that could be examined by 
the Committee to the jurisdiction of the State party. Both mechanisms carry some 
limitations – they need to be opted in by the State party, and they do not entitle vic-
tims, but other State parties or in the case of the inquiry procedure the Committee, 
to initiate the procedure – but they might also have some advantages. For example, 
an inter-State communication brought by a State party against another State party 
for an extraterritorial violation can serve both to protect the sovereign interest of the 
former State and the rights of the affected victims.10 The inquiry procedure can be 
triggered by well-documented reports prepared by civil society organizations indi-
cating grave or systematic extraterritorial violations by a State party, without actu-
ally requiring them to bear the weight of the whole procedure.
4 Entry into force
The OP-ICESCR was open for signature and ratification on 24 September 
2009. The pace of ratification has been slow, but the numbers of ratifications is re-
aching the ten required for entry into force. As of 1 June 2012, 8 State parties have 
signed and ratified it: Ecuador, Mongolia, Spain, El Salvador, Argentina, Bolivia, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Slovakia. Another 32 countries have signed it. 
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